A Prayer for Constitutional Comparativism in Eighth
Amendment Cases

The relevance of contemporary foreign sources to questions of constitutional interpretation is hotly debated
within the Supreme Court and beyond.1 It has been an
issue of particular importance in the Court’s recent Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence where the members of a core
majority have engaged in versions of constitutional comparativism when addressing the boundaries of “cruel and
unusual punishment[].” This article provides a schematic
argument in support of appeals to international law in
Eighth Amendment cases. In particular, it contends that
jurists and scholars committed to originalism ought to
consider contemporary foreign sources in Eighth Amendment cases.
The Court’s recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
has been guided by three principles announced in Trop v.
Dulles: that “the words of the Amendment are not precise,” “that their scope is not static,” and that the
“Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”2 In order to gauge this progress the Court has traditionally surveyed the practices of the several states and
federal authorities, declaring unconstitutional only those
practices rejected by a clear domestic consensus.3 In Atkins
v. Virginia and Roper v. Simons the Court expanded the
scope of its survey, consulting the practices of foreign
states and transnational institutions to determine the
objective decency of executing mentally retarded
offenders4 and juveniles under the age of eighteen.5 In
each case a vocal minority dissented both from the result
and from the use of foreign sources based, inter alia, on a
commitment to originalism.6
Originalists hold the view that the role of the judiciary
in constitutional adjudication is to determine what the text
meant at the time it was adopted.7 This project may be
advanced by consulting ancient foreign legal sources to
the extent they shaped the then-contemporary objective
meaning of the language.8 Modern foreign sources are
irrelevant, however. Further, like evidence of framers’
intent, reference to contemporary foreign sources converts
the Constitution into a free-flying balloon, without objective meaning and, because subject to the creative
interpretations of judges seeking to advance their own

political agendas, incapable of establishing stable limits on
governmental action.9
This article joins the originalist minority of the Court
in rejecting claims that “cruel and unusual punishments”
is not precise, that its scope is not static, and that this language must draw meaning from “the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”
However, it contends that originalists’ refusals to consult
contemporary foreign sources in Eighth Amendment
cases reflect a methodological error. A closer look at the
role of original meaning in Eighth Amendment analysis
reveals why this is so.
Recognizing the fact of semantic drift, originalism limits the discretionary authority of appointed judges while
providing stable limits on legislative and executive action
by resisting the siren’s song of a living constitution.10 In
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence this contest has come
down to one between what those living in late-eighteenthcentury America thought was cruel versus what modern
Americans and fellow members of our international
human rights culture regard as cruel.11 From an originalist
point of view, this debate is wrongheaded.
In order to put the train back on the rails, it is essential
to be rigorously faithful to the foundational commitment
to original meaning. There is no doubt that moral realism
was the prevailing view in the United States in 1791.12 In
particular, building on Blackstone’s Commentaries and
the work of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century liberals,
the dominant view was that justice and right in the world
were a function of faith to the natural law. While there is
no textual ground on which one can conclude that the
Constitution incorporates the whole of the natural law,
certain passages indisputably attach to objective right. The
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment is one of these.
Given that the framers and their audience were moral
realists, it must be admitted that “cruel” originally meant to
pick out practices that are, and always will be, cruel.13 If this
is so, then it follows that judges charged with enforcing the
Eighth Amendment must determine whether state conduct
falls within the natural category of “cruelty.” This is not the
same as determining what the framers and other residents
of late-eighteenth-century America thought was cruel.
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While they likely had strong views on the subject, for a
court to limit its inquiry to their views would give unwarranted privilege to eighteenth-century moral beliefs. If the
goal is to discover original meaning, and “cruel” meant
then, as it does now, to pick out an objective moral category, then it is the court’s duty to discover the content of
that category. Forgoing this search in favor of an inquiry
into what the framers intended to capture with “cruel and
unusual” either involves a category mistake or requires a
move from originalism to intentionalism.
A contemporary devotee of moral realism might recognize that the framers were kindred spirits but challenge
the view that unelected judges ought to engage in moral
inquiry when deciding Eighth Amendment cases.14 Disagreements among committed moral realists define our
times, as they have most of modern history. One might
believe that well-ordered societies have a duty to resolve
correctly these disputes in order to conform their practices
to natural law. It does not follow, however, that unelected
judges have the authority to make the call. Rather, given
democratic commitments to legitimacy and collective will
formation, it seems improper for judges to usurp the
elected branches, which have the political authority to
resolve normative contests that arise in diverse societies.15
From the point of view of democratic theory, there is
little to dispute in the claim that the elected branches have
authority to resolve contests over policy and collective conceptions of the good life and that courts must generally
limit themselves to resolving disputes. Constitutional
courts have a unique role, however. In constitutional
democracies these bodies are charged with enforcing
objective limitations on law and policy according to foundational boundaries enshrined in a constitution.16
Objectivity and stability are critical to the exercise of this
authority and, as originalists have pointed out, resolving
constitutional disputes by reference to the natural law
presents serious epistemic problems. Judges are not oracles, and any attempt by a court to reach an earnest view
on what is cruel risks deteriorating into rank subjectivity.
Two daunting problems follow.
First, in the face of this epistemic challenge courts
have relied on “the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.” While some
may take solace in the implied teleology, there is no warrant for a court to find the practices of contemporary
institutions more humane than those of their predecessors based solely on fear of anachronism.17 Further, just as
opinions on what constitutes cruelty vary between individuals (including judges), they vary over time. Thus,
interpreting “cruelty” through the lens of contemporary
opinion eliminates the capacity of the Constitution to act
as a stable check on government action.
Second, relying on appointed judges, immune from
electoral review, to decide contested normative questions is
decidedly undemocratic. While there is no guarantee that
the elected branches will find the right answers to questions about the content of natural law, they at least have the
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benefit of democratic legitimacy through electoral accountability. Further, legislative and executive opinions are
reversible, whereas stare decisis may limit the capacity of
future courts to correct errors by their forebears.
All of this suggests that courts ought to leave the tough
moral questions to civil society, the states, and the elected
branches. In most circumstances there is no sound objection to this view. In certain cases, however, the
Constitution gives specific authority to the courts to resolve
moral contests in order to impose moral limits on the
elected branches. Eighth Amendment cases are such circumstances. In these cases, a court’s refusal to decide the
objective meaning of “cruelty” involves a derogation of constitutional duty and leaves the foxes to guard the henhouse.
Courts that take up this gauntlet must confront their
epistemic limitations. However, if the foregoing is right,
then courts deciding Eighth Amendment cases must
embrace the challenge of determining the actual meaning
of “cruel and unusual” rather than abdicating to eighteenth-century views. The question that remains is how.
One path might be for judges to exercise their independent judgment.18 While faithful to originalism, such a
strategy begs the fundamental questions of how a mortal
judge can avoid subjectivity. Adopting an objective mode
to consider scientific evidence relating to the decisional
capacities of certain classes of offender or the objective
utility of specific practices may solve the problem to some
extent,19 but such endeavors present their own epistemic
challenges, particularly in regard to the selection and
interpretation of evidence.
Another tack is to adopt an intersubjective mode. While
a full argument for this position is beyond the scope of this
short article, the insight is straightforward. In the absence
of Platonic capacities, the best path to Truth is through
substantive and open exchange with others who have an
interest in the answer. This intuition underlies democratic
politics and justifies truth claims by reference to a discursive process that starts in civil society and ends in law and
official policy. In the few cases where determination of the
moral truth is reserved for the courts, judges should incorporate a similar process into their deliberations. This task
can only be achieved by consulting the same diversity of
opinions and sources that would be relevant in salons and
legislatures. The opinions of those foreign courts which
have engaged the same issues have obvious relevance in
such a pursuit. This conclusion must not be overstated. Listening does not entail deference. Foreign views on cruelty,
like those of our founders, should be heard in cases
addressing the constitutionality of a punitive practice, but
they are only one voice in the conversation.
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